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Public acceptability of climate change mitigation policies: discrete choice experiments in three European countries

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Public acceptability and support: why?

Motivation:

- reluctance among politicians to implement policies **lacking public support** are factors that can inhibit the successful implementation of climate policies (e.g. Steg et al. 2006)
- failure to introduce the carbon-energy taxation (in France in 2010, etc.), even already implemented carbon tax can be repealed partially due to unpopularity among public, such as the Australian carbon tax in 2014 (Rootes, 2014)

Aim:

- understanding of **acceptability of climate change policies** to preclude public resistance

Objectives and approch

Objective

– to analyse **factors influencing public acceptance**:

- characteristics of policies and instruments
- socio-demographic and socio-psychological variables

Approach

- Systematic review of studies
- Own empirical studies

Insights from the literature review

Climate policies tend to be acceptable by people who…

- are **aware of** the climate changes
- feel more **responsible** for the associated environmental problems
- feel a stronger **moral obligation** to contribute to the solution
- perceive the policies to be **fair**
    - distribution of costs / environmental benefits
    - preference for polluter-pays principle
- perceive the policies to be **effective** in reducing impacts
    - temperature increase
    - % reduction of GHG emissions

Our study

- Surveys conducted in three EU countries: the **Czech Republic**, **Poland**, and **the UK** in September and October 2015
- representative of national populations aged 18 to 69 years in terms of gender, age, region and education
- web-based questionnaires administered either by interviewers personally (CAPI) or by online access panels (CAWI)

country	survey mode	valid obs.
Czech Republic	CAWI	1,150
	CAPI	431
Poland	CAWI	837
	CAPI	429
United Kingdom	CAWI	1,251

The study: Discrete choice experiments

Two experiments on acceptability of policies

1. to reach **the GHG emission target by 2020, 2030, and 2050**
2. to reach the 2050 emission target when **policy instruments differ**

Acceptability is analysed by means of **the discrete choice experiments**

- Respondents are asked to choose a policy **they prefer the best**
- One of the presented policies is **a status quo**, i.e. the current policy that costs additionally nothing, but will not bring any further reductions
- Policies are described by their **attributes** (approach, cost distribution, burden sharing, policy instruments, use of revenues)
- One of the policy attributes is increased monthly **costs** for household

Econometric model

1. **Conditional Logit (CL)**
   - only observed preference heterogeneity (not presented here) → $\hat{\beta}$

2. **Mixed logit** (Random Parameter Logit, MXL)
   - MXLd = MXL without correlated (random) parameters → mean(β_i), s.d.(β_i)
   - **MXL = MXL with correlated (random) parameters** → full covariance matrix

3. **Latent Class Model (LC)**
   - individuals who belong to the same class share the same preferences, whereas preferences between classes can considerably vary
   - (if LC=1 → CL)

4. **Hybrid Mixed Logit (HMXL)**
   - combines MXL with the Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model (Jöreskog and Goldberger 1975). Applied in transportation (Johansson et al. 2006; Daziano & Bolduc 2013) or enviro (Hess & Beharry-Borg (2011); Dekker et al. 2012; Czajkowski et al. 2016).
   - MXL combined with Latent attitudinal variables (Ščasný et al. 2015).

Mixed Logit in WTP space

Indirect utility additive in attributes

$$V_{ijt} = \mathbf{X}_{ijt}\mathbf{b}_i + p_{ijt}a_i + e_{ijt}$$

Assuming IIA extreme value I → probability is

$$P(j|J) = \frac{\exp\left(\boldsymbol{X}_{ijt}\left(\sigma_i\mathbf{b}_i\right) + p_{ijt}\left(\sigma_i a_i\right)\right)}{\sum_{k=1}^{J}\exp\left(\boldsymbol{X}_{ikt}\left(\sigma_i\mathbf{b}_i\right) + p_{ikt}\left(\sigma_i a_i\right)\right)}$$

WTP for non-monetary X, a money metric utility function → estimating parameters in WTP space (Train and Weeks 2005)

$$U_{ijt} = \sigma_i a_i\left(\boldsymbol{X}_{ijt}\frac{\sigma_i\mathbf{b}_i}{\sigma_i a_i} + p_{ijt}\right) + \varepsilon_{ijt} = \sigma_i a_i\left(\boldsymbol{X}_{ijt\ \ i} + p_{ijt}\right) + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

the estimates can be readily interpreted as marginal WTP for X

Mixed Logit in WTP space

- All **X** coefficients are random and **freely correlated**, i.e. df=54 for 9 covariates of the basic model (full cov matrix estimated, compare with df=(9+9) for MXLd or df=9 for CL)
- all coefficients are assumed to be **normally distributed**, with the exception of marginal utility of income, which is assumed to follow a **lognormal** distribution
- The **cost** enters the model with a negative sign and was scaled by a factor of 100 to facilitate convergence.
- the model is estimated using the maximum simulated likelihood method (Revelt & Train, 1998)

Results

Discrete choice experiment No. 1
Emission reduction targets

DCE1: Design

Policies that may be introduced by the EU in order to mitigate climate change impacts differ in:

- GHG **emission reduction targets** at the EU
- **Burden sharing** across the EU Member States
- **Cost distribution** among inhabitants of a country
- Increased monthly **costs** for your household

DCE1: The EU emission reduction targets

	20% reduction by 2020	40% reduction by 2030	80% reduction by 2050
GHG volume	emissions remain more-less as now, may slightly increase (**black dotted line**)	-20% by 2020 -40% by 2030 then, remain stable **(light red line)**	-20% by 2020 -40% by 2030 -80% by 2050 **(dark red line)**
Policy status	policy that has been agreed at the EU and is currently being implemented	EU commitment, measures not implemented yet	EU commitment, measures not implemented yet



DCE1: Information about the EU emission reduction targets /2/

	20% reduction by 2020	40% reduction by 2030	80% reduction by 2050
Increase in global average temp. by 2100 (rel. to 1986-2005) **- if the rest of the world adopts equivalent targets**	2.6 °C to 4.8 °C	1.2 °C to 2.8 °C	0.7 °C to 2.2 °C
Likely impacts	**Severe** • large drop in agricultural production • loss of most coastal areas • substantial threat to human health caused by disease, malnutrition, heat waves, floods and droughts • widespread extinction of animal and plant species, loss of their habitats	**Moderate** • moderate drop in agricultural production • loss of many coastal areas • some threat to human health caused by disease, malnutrition, heat waves, floods and droughts • extinction of some animal and plant species and loss of their habitats (especially coral reefs,	**Mild** • the most severe impacts of climate change are prevented • some effects of global warming will be felt, however not as severe as in the other reduction scenarios

DCE1: Experimental design

Emissions reduction target for the European Union (increase in global average temperature by 2100)	• **-20%** by 2020 (+**2.6–4.8°C** by 2100) • **-40%** by 2030 (+**1.2–2.8°C** by 2100) • **-80** by 2050 (+**0.7–2.2°C** by 2100) *Status Quo:* 20% reduction by 2020; current policy
Distribution of costs among the European Union countries *(EU)*	• richer states pay more *('GDP')* • states with higher population pay more *('person')* • higher emitting states pay more *('GHG')* *Status Quo:* richer states pay more
Distribution of costs among the citizens of *[member state](MS)*	• everyone pays the same amount *('person')* • everyone pays the same income percentage *('income')* • the rich pay a higher income percentage *('rich')* • those who emit more pay more *('GHG')* *Status Quo:* everyone pays the same income percentage
Increased monthly costs for your household	€20, €33, €65, €95, €130, €150 *Status Quo:* €0

DCE1: Example of a choice card

	Policy A	Policy B	Current policy
EU emission reduction target Increase in global average temperature by 2100 if the rest of the world complies equivalently	**40%** reduction by 2030 1.2 °C to 2.8 °C	**80%** reduction by 2050 0.7 °C to 2.2 °C	**20%** reduction by 2020 2.6 °C to 4.8 °C
Likely impacts	Moderate	Mild	Severe
Distribution of costs among the EU countries	states with higher population pay more	higher emitting states pay more	richer states pay more
Distribution of costs among the Czech citizens	every citizen pays the same amount	everyone pays the same income percentage	everyone pays the same income percentage
Increased monthly costs for your household	25 €	75 €	0 €
Which policy do you consider the best taking into account you and your household?	☒	☒	☒

DCE1: MXL
WTP space (in EUR, PPS)

	Czech Republic		United Kingdom		Poland	
	means	standard deviations	means	standard deviations	means	standard deviations
	coefficient (s.e.)	coefficient (s.e.)	coefficient (s.e.)	coefficient (s.e.)	coefficient (s.e.)	coefficient (s.e.)
target = 20% (ref.)	0	0	0	0	0	0
target = 40%	13.19*** (2.78)	37.05*** (2.75)	45.79*** (6.26)	97.55*** (10.00)	-1.76 (2.53)	31.15*** (2.94)
target = 80%	17.04*** (3.02)	46.77*** (2.89)	43.57*** (8.36)	149.21*** (10.11)	-0.14 (2.57)	32.59*** (1.73)
burden sharing EU = GDP (ref.)	0	0	0	0	0	0
burden sharing EU = person	3.61 (2.56)	25.26*** (3.04)	-8.39 (5.43)	25.85*** (8.07)	-3.08 (2.16)	10.48*** (1.68)
burden sharing EU = GHG	14.98*** (2.56)	22.14*** (2.62)	27.13*** (6.21)	47.36*** (6.70)	-2.49 (2.33)	11.88*** (1.90)
cost distribution MS = income (ref.)	0	0	0	0	0	0
cost distribution MS = person	-12.78*** (2.96)	16.33*** (2.88)	-15.72** (7.49)	41.23*** (7.37)	-6.28** (3.05)	14.75*** (1.59)
cost distribution MS = rich	3.81 (3.09)	33.07*** (3.28)	23.21*** (8.02)	61.75*** (12.15)	4.47 (3.02)	22.23*** (2.32)
cost distribution MS = GHG	20.94*** (3.41)	49.10*** (4.01)	33.17*** (9.12)	81.69*** (8.65)	12.48*** (3.50)	24.31*** (3.17)
status quo (alternative specific constant)	-12.82*** (3.82)	81.80*** (5.44)	-39.07*** (8.82)	161.16*** (16.57)	15.95*** (3.03)	83.65*** (4.83)
-cost(100 EUR)*scale	1.39*** (0.07)	1.33*** (0.17)	0.58*** (0.08)	1.78*** (0.24)	2.02*** (0.16)	2.27*** (0.36)

Implicit WTP for policy packages, in EUR per month and household



Note: Burden sharing across the EU Member States (EU) and distribution of the cost within a member state (MS) is linked to greenhouse gas emissions released by a country or household respectively ('GHG'), to GDP or income, progressively to household income ('rich'), or is based on lump sum allocation ('person').
Estimates of means depicted as points and 95% confidence intervals as lines.

Latent Class Model, CZ, 3 classes

LC									
Variable	Class 1			Class 2			Class 3		
Utility model									
Variable	coef.	st.err.	p-value	coef.	st.err.	p-value	coef.	st.err.	p-value
SQ	-1.2780	0.1533	0.0000	3.0802	1.3155	0.0192	-0.2409	0.0297	0.0000
target = 40%	0.5767	0.0757	0.0000	-0.7239	0.3856	0.0604	0.0936	0.0210	0.0000
target = 80%	0.6702	0.0877	0.0000	-0.0233	0.1959	0.9053	0.1121	0.0225	0.0000
burden sharing = lump sum	-0.0430	0.0496	0.3860	-0.1290	0.1938	0.5057	0.0605	0.0204	0.0030
burden sharing = emission	0.3142	0.0552	0.0000	-0.1617	0.2072	0.4350	0.1150	0.0223	0.0000
cost distib = lump sum	-0.2193	0.0624	0.0004	0.0657	0.3220	0.8383	-0.1052	0.0242	0.0000
cost distib = progressive	-0.0117	0.0578	0.8399	1.0976	0.5404	0.0422	-0.0511	0.0245	0.0370
cost distib = emission	0.5999	0.0859	0.0000	1.0025	0.4721	0.0337	0.0185	0.0290	0.5237
-cost (100 EUR)	1.1457	0.1239	0.0000	0.9382	0.3307	0.0046	4.8612	0.5318	0.0000
Latent class probability model									
Variable	coef.	st.err.	p-value	coef.	st.err.	p-value	coef.	st.err.	p-value
Constant	0.5628	0.4724	0.2335	-0.7015	0.4805	0.1443	-		
male	0.2743	0.1622	0.0908	0.5871	0.1649	0.0004	-		
age	-0.0065	0.0062	0.2900	0.0154	0.0061	0.0121	-		
income norm.	0.1244	0.0794	0.1171	0.0675	0.0877	0.4419	-		
income missing	-0.1656	0.1735	0.3397	0.2408	0.1743	0.1671	-		
HH size	0.0111	0.0888	0.9002	0.0895	0.0874	0.3060	-		
no. of children	-0.0081	0.1125	0.9424	-0.1108	0.1183	0.3491	-		
edu3	0.0752	0.2968	0.8000	-0.2758	0.2952	0.3500	-		
edu4	0.0846	0.3445	0.8061	-0.1019	0.3367	0.7621	-		
edu5	-0.8159	0.3778	0.0308	-0.9867	0.3932	0.0121	-		
edu6	-0.0081	0.2816	0.9771	-0.2871	0.2872	0.3176	-		
edu7-8	-0.2388	0.3274	0.4658	-0.5967	0.3376	0.0772	-		
edu9	-0.5454	0.3898	0.1617	-1.1764	0.4478	0.0086	-		
edu10-11	0.0190	0.3231	0.9530	-0.4929	0.3360	0.1424	-		
Average class probabilities	0.3874			0.3303			0.2822		

Summary of the results - DCE1
Latent Class Model (3 classes)

	CZ			UK			PL		
	against	*modest*	*green*	*against*	*modest*	*green*	*against*	*modest*	*green*
SQ*	308	-24	-128	217	-27	-323	0	-8	-135
target = 40%*	-72	9	58	-32	44	139	0	4	26
target = 80%*	0	11	67	-34	45	215	0	2	24
burden sharing EU	GDP	GHG person	GHG	GHG	indiffer.	GHG	indiffer.	indiffer.	indiffer.
cost distribution MS	rich	GHG	GHG	indiffer	GHG	GHG rich	indiffer	indiffer	GHG rich

cl

Class probability



Respondents who think that the stricter emission reduction policy will be implemented, in %



Results when controlling for a belief in policy implementation, MNL, preference space

	Czech Republic			United Kingdom			Poland		
	coef.	st.err.	p-value	coef.	st.err.	p-value	coef.	st.err.	p-value
SQ	0.1432	0.0551	0.0093	0.7765	0.0705	<.0001	0.5345	0.0676	<.0001
_*implYES	-0.2348	0.0939	0.0124	-0.2346	0.0872	0.0071	-0.6100	0.0931	<.0001
_*implNO	0.3944	0.0901	<.0001	0.7993	0.1449	<.0001	0.3764	0.1085	0.0005
target = 40%	0.4055	0.0462	<.0001	0.1784	0.0620	0.0040	0.4363	0.0590	<.0001
_*implYES	-0.0551	0.1131	0.6263	0.0232	0.1147	0.8397	-0.2414	0.1182	0.0412
_*implNO	0.0467	0.1122	0.6771	0.0467	0.1954	0.8112	-0.0374	0.1405	0.7902
target = 80%	0.5126	0.0474	<.0001	0.2333	0.0627	0.0002	0.6110	0.0555	<.0001
_*implYES	0.1381	0.1121	0.2180	-0.1261	0.1184	0.2870	-0.2716	0.1095	0.0131
_*implNO	-0.0351	0.1147	0.7592	0.1849	0.1934	0.3390	0.0829	0.1310	0.5268
burden sharing EU = person	0.0272	0.0383	0.4768	-0.0299	0.0500	0.5496	-0.0499	0.0449	0.2665
burden sharing EU = GHG	0.2705	0.0389	<.0001	0.0156	0.0497	0.7538	0.2555	0.0439	<.0001
cost distrib MS= person	-0.3047	0.0473	<.0001	-0.0124	0.0603	0.8367	-0.0611	0.0557	0.2731
cost distrib MS= rich	-0.0611	0.0445	0.1699	0.1487	0.0592	0.0120	0.2066	0.0510	<.0001
cost distrib MS= GHG	0.3562	0.0444	<.0001	0.3280	0.0596	<.0001	0.2728	0.0521	<.0001
cost (EUR)	-0.0164	0.0006	<.0001	-0.0174	0.0009	<.0001	-0.0065	0.0003	<.0001
No ID	1581			1266			1251		
No obs.	9486			7596			7506		
LL	-9601			-6649			-7567		
LL0	-10421			-8345			-8246		

Results

Discrete choice experiment No. 2
Policy instruments

How much would the following policy measures infringe on your personal freedom?

How likely is it that the following measures will succeed in reaching the goal of emissions reduction by 80%?

DCE2 Instruments: Experimental design

Attribute	Level
Policy measure	• Technology & energy performance **standards** •**Subsidies** for energy savings •**Taxes** on energy and emissions •Emissions **trading** system •Removal of environmentally **harmful subsidies** •**Information** provision
Revenue recycling in the *country*	**NO** or **YES** **…** if YES then … •**Support** for energy savings, envi programs, clean techs •Improvement of **public services** (health, education) •**Public debt** reduction •**Social** problems mitigation •**Research & technology** development •Increase spending according to **current allocation** •Reduce taxes on **labour and goods**
Increase in your monthly costs until 2050	• 0€ --- *[in SQ only]* • 20€, 33€, 65€, 95€, 130€, 150€

Status quo = current measures (emission targets will not be fulfilled after 2020) but costs nothing; revenue recycling and cost distribution not further specified

DCE2 Example of a choice card

Instruments to reach 80% emission reduction by 2050

	Policy A	Policy B	Current policy
Emissions reduction target for the European Union	**80%** reduction by **2050**	**80%** reduction by **2050**	**20%** reduction by **2020**
Policy measure	Taxes on energy and emissions **+** Removal of environmentally harmful subsidies	Taxes on energy and emissions **+** Subsidies for energy savings	No additional
Generation of new revenues for state budget	yes	yes	No
Use of additional revenues in the Czech Republic	environmental programs	public services (health, education)	
Increased monthly costs for your household	**25 €**	**75 €**	**0 €**
Which policy do you consider the best taking into account you and your household?	☒	☒	☒

Estimation results- DCE2: MXL model (WTP in EUR)

	means coef. (s.e.)	std. coef. (s.e.)	means coef. (s.e.)	std coef. (s.e.)	means coef. (s.e.)	std coef. (s.e.)
instrument = tax (ref.)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
= permits	-7.73*** (1.52)	15.41*** (1.88)	12.65*** (4.64)	45.11*** (9.52)	7.53*** (1.86)	21.28** (3.91)
= removal of subsidies	5.09*** (1.49)	18.18*** (2.19)	-5.90 (4.96)	50.06*** (9.51)	4.61** (1.97)	13.19** (2.55)
= bans and standards	0.53 (1.63)	7.06*** (1.84)	3.31 (5.04)	33.19*** (9.36)	7.04*** (1.89)	7.78** (1.72)
= information	-0.65 (1.58)	10.79*** (1.74)	3.63 (5.04)	45.05*** (8.40)	0.24 (1.86)	10.43** (2.59)
= subsidies	4.45** (1.75)	6.27*** (1.54)	5.15 (5.20)	35.36*** (8.41)	0.12 (2.27)	23.29** (3.85)
status quo (ASC)	-45.2*** (2.5)	91.62*** (5.26)	-86.3*** (8.05)	228.2*** (21.25)	-4.46 (2.45)	83.43** (7.24)
-cost(100 EUR)*scale	2.56*** (0.14)	2.19*** (0.18)	1.78*** (0.15)	2.69*** (0.25)	4.27*** (0.38)	3.91** (0.41)

Estimation results- DCE2: MXL model (WTP in EUR)

	means coef. (s.e.)	std. coef. (s.e.)	means coef. (s.e.)	std coef. (s.e.)	means coef. (s.e.)	std coef. (s.e.)
revenue recycling = no (ref.)	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
RR = environment	**15.45*** ** (2.63)	35.71*** (3.55)	-2.99 (8.69)	124.87*** (16.49)	**-14.11*** ** (3.73)	58.88*** (5.99)
RR = public services	**14.25*** ** (2.85)	31.71*** (3.97)	**20.68** ** (8.54)	110.34*** (14.33)	-6.55 (3.66)	56.97*** (6.34)
RR = social problems	9.48*** (2.30)	18.16*** (3.26)	-13.54 (9.98)	123.18*** (16.75)	-3.68 (2.72)	42.81*** (5.72)
RR = R&D	8.32*** (2.58)	36.24*** (3.30)	11.13 (8.13)	108.96*** (13.29)	-6.00 (3.63)	50.22*** (6.45)
RR = public debt	8.71*** (2.84)	35.39*** (2.99)	**18.50** ** (9.07)	98.55*** (15.43)	-2.18 (3.20)	45.23*** (6.90)
RR = current allocation	1.88 (3.02)	31.67*** (2.92)	2.36 (7.05)	81.44*** (13.18)	**-6.04** ** (2.71)	26.09*** (5.28)
RR = reduce taxes	**14.46*** ** (2.51)	23.94*** (3.30)	9.80 (7.16)	67.46*** (11.88)	-8.26 (4.72)	78.34*** (8.80)
Model diagnostics						
Log-likelihood (constant only)	-10,145.54		-7,978.66		-7,230.92	
Log-likelihood	-6,871.11		-5,013.73		-4,537.10	

Estimation results- DCE2: hybrid mixed logit, WTP-space
Which segments of population accept the 80 % target?

Perceived knowledge

Know more about the climate change:

- **less likely** to choose the **20% reduction** by 2020 (SQ) in all 3 countries
- WTP larger for **permits** and in favour of revenues on **R&D** in CZ
- have stronger preferences for the **removal of harmful subsidies** and revenues on **env. protection in the UK**

Climate change concern

More concerned about climate change:

- in favour of **removal of harmful subsidies** and even **less likely to choose the status quo**

Conclusions

- stark differences between the countries
- for the 40% or 80% GHG emission reductions
  - the Czechs: 13-17 EUR per month
  - the British: 44-46 EUR per month
  - the Poles: not statistically significantly different from 0 (reference the current 20% target).
- Huge (unobserved) heterogeneity

Conclusions

‘green’ supporters

- 44% in the UK and 39% in the Czech Republic, 25% in Poland
- Strong preference for the principle of distribution linked to **emission volumes**, dislike the lump sum **(per capita)** cost allocation

‘against’

- It is the dominant class in Poland (45%)
- indifferent with respect to the cost allocation rule in UK and POL, as they do not like the mitigation policy at all
- less educated

Conclusions

Policy instruments

- UK: strong preference for the emissions **permit system**
- POL: prefer the emissions **permit system**, providing **bans** and technological **standards** followed by harmful subsidy removal
- CZE: prefer removal of **harmful subsidies** and **subsidy** provision, **permits** are considered even worse than tax.

- Using tax in combination with other instruments does not improve acceptability of taxes.

Conclusions

Earmarking the revenues

- UK: support using the revenues for **public services** (such as public health or education) and reducing **public debt**
- POL: their preferences for instruments that generate additional budget revenues were the weakest among 3 countries; dislike using revenues according to **current allocation**
- CZE: prefer **environmental** projects, **public services** and reducing **current taxes** the most

Conclusions

Public acceptability of policies to reach the GHG emission reduction targets may be raised by

- **taking into account distributional consequences,** especially introducing distribution of costs based on the emissions, i.e. implementing the polluter-pays principle
- strengthening **trust** in government and public organizations (transparency, public participation)
- **campaign focused on perception of climate changes, the policy roadmap supported by a binding policy commitment,** as people prefer the stricter emission targets more, if they believe that the policy is likely to be implemented

Thank you for your attention

More details

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